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Eleanor Davey
1 This article discusses an understudied part of the cross-border operation into Ethiopia
during the famine and conflict of the 1980s. It takes as its main focus the Eritrea Inter
Agency Consortium (EIAC),  a group of aid agencies and activist  organisations,  some
long-standing, some single-issue, that funded relief and development projects of the
Eritrean liberation movement. Contemporary aid analysts considered the international
mobilisation for Ethiopia a particularly important case for understanding the role of
non-governmental  organisations and it  has retained attention as an example of  aid
“gone wild”.1 The cross-border operation specifically became “a subject of mystique
and admiration among those who participated”.2 Yet short-lived initiatives such as the
Eritrea Inter Agency Consortium have received only limited attention from historians.
2 Historicising these ad hoc initiatives can contribute to understandings of contemporary
aid  practices.  Despite  the  blurred  line  between  them,  the  operational  fields  of
development  and  relief  work  have  generated  distinctive  practitioner  and  scholarly
literatures.3 Around  the  beginning  of  the 1990s,  influenced  by  the  rise  of  market
ideologies in the 1980s and the shifting of  Cold War frameworks at  the end of  that
decade,  long-standing  development  debates  gave  rise  to  a  wave  of  critical  studies.
These  studies  took  development  itself  as  a  subject  of  (often  historical)  inquiry,
highlighting  both  its  appeal  and  its  seeming  failure.  As  Joseph  Morgan  Hodge  has
argued  in  a  survey  of  the  historiography  of  development,  the  “postdevelopment”
critics conceived of development as a discursive construct, a predominantly Western,
and especially  American invention.4 Around the  same period –some a  little  earlier,
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some  later–  scholars  of  emergency  relief  were  putting  forward  a  critique  of  its
insufficiencies  and  lack  of  engagement  with  politics.  This  was  when  many
organisations’  “relief”  or  “emergency”  departments  began  to  use  the  term
“humanitarian”, a sign of the rising influence of legal frameworks and the expanding
influence of four key principles (humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence)
as  a  marker  of  humanitarian  identity.  The  brief  exploration  of  a  “new
humanitarianism” that would lift  the taboo on political  intervention gave way to a
more enduring line of critique about the perverse consequences of aid as exacerbating
the suffering it seeks to assuage.5
3 If the postdevelopment scholars challenged the idea of progress in aid, the second set
of critics addressed its claims to purity. These two sets of literature –on development
and relief– have also tended to organize their studies around different “aidland” actors.
6 While they recognised that development discourse requires multiple organisations
and groups to  participate,  the postdevelopment scholars  emphasised development’s
central,  self-referential,  top-down characteristics:  the  role  of  the  state.  In  contrast,
studies of the paradoxes of relief aid are most likely to adopt the normative position of
the aid organisation. The primary motivation of humanitarian organisations is more or
less taken for granted, even as the unintended consequences of their actions, and some
of  the  perverse  organisational  pressures  they  face  and  create,  are  recognised  and
analysed. The best interests of people affected by conflict are hence conflated with the
priorities of relief organisations, often non-governmental organisations (NGOs), even as
studies recognise the gap between them.7
4 A further challenge to narratives of progress and purity comes from the scholarship on
“non-state  armed  actors”,  a  field  which  has  sought  to  understand  the  politics,
workings, behaviours, and evolution of armed groups of different kinds. The category is
heterogeneous and may include such diverse groups as militias, urban gangs, criminal
networks,  warlords,  militant  groups,  transnational  networks,  private  security
companies,  and insurgent groups.8 From the perspective of  aid studies these armed
groups are often treated in relation to the risk of misuse or instrumentalisation of aid.9
But the distinction between state and non-state actors must be treated with caution;
groups  that  aspire  to  statehood  often  seek  to  dissemble  their  “non-state”  status
through  practical  and  symbolic  measures  that  facilitate  their  image  as  a  state-in-
making.10 Symbolic  processes  are  integral  to  this  insurgent  governance  and  of
particular  importance  in  aid  work.  Like  the  case  of  Algerian  independence  in
the 1950s-60s,11 conflict in East Africa in the 1980s offers a fruitful terrain for exploring
aid  as  symbolic  power,  material  resource,  and  diplomatic  support.  In  Eritrea
specifically, the combination of a self-determination cause and a self-reliance ideology
contributed to the powerful appeal of an aid partnership with the Eritrean liberation
movement.
5 It  is  often  difficult  to  access  consistent  documentation  on  conflict  roles  of  aid
organisations, due to the wartime setting, the need or perceived need for secrecy, the
adoption  of  don’t-ask-don’t-tell  ways  of  operating,  and  the  limited  investment  in
establishing or maintaining archives. This study was made possible by access to a set of
documents  from  the  Eritrea  Inter  Agency  Consortium,  shared  by  the  consortium’s
chair,  Roger  Briottet.  An  international  jurist,  educator  and  solidarity  campaigner,
Briottet had a long-standing engagement with Ethiopia.12 The minutes and planning
documents  that  constitute  much  of  this  personal  collection  also  left  traces  in  the
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archives of organisations that contributed to the cross-border operation such as War
on Want, Christian Aid and Norwegian Church Aid.13 The documentation is significantly
less  complete  for  the  later  years  of  the  consortium,  a  period that  also  has  limited
coverage in some other archives. However, it is not only operational documents that
help to understand the politics and practicalities of aid –the article also uses additional
public materials like press releases and marketing material from the Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF) and its aid arm; published sources, particularly related to the
advocacy  campaign  for  Eritrean  independence;  and  grey  literature  on  the  aid
mobilisation.  These  materials  are  drawn  largely  from  the  British  side,  due  to  the
important role of the anti-poverty campaigning organisation War on Want –which was
the  lead  agency  of  the  EIAC–  and  the  network  of  Eritrean  supporters  amongst
intellectuals, activists, and aid experts in Britain. Established in 1952, War on Want had
roots  in  socialist,  pacifist,  internationalist  circles.  Its  name  was  derived  from  a
campaign  calling  for  spending  on  the  Cold  War  arms  race  to  be  reallocated  to
international  development.  Over  time,  its  willingness  to  take  on  social  justice
campaigning has given War on Want a complex relationship with less overtly politically
positioned  aid organisations.14 This  campaigning  edge  was,  however,  crucial  to  the
EIAC.
6 The  article  argues  that  the  consortium’s  collaborative  make-up  allowed  for  a
combination  of  technocracy  and  activism,  alternately  evacuating  and  emphasising
political  agendas.  The  Eritrea  Inter  Agency  Consortium and the  wider  cross-border
operation thus subverted the mechanisms that make of development discourse –to take
James Ferguson’s phrase–an “anti-politics machine”.15 In his classic study, Ferguson, a
key postdevelopment critic, argued that aid discourse drew power from its claims to be
technical and hence apolitical. While development projects had the effect of expanding
state power, he argued, they did this through “the suspension of politics from even the
most sensitive political operations”.16 However, in the work of the Eritrea Inter Agency
Consortium,  rather  than  reinforcing  the  Ethiopian  state,  the  technical  expertise
coexisted with support for the Eritrean independence struggle. In this case, therefore,
the state-centric workings of the anti-politics machine benefited an armed opposition
movement.  The  article  first  explains  the  establishment  and  workings  of  the
consortium, before turning to how the politics of solidarity shaped the consortium’s
positioning.  It  concludes  by  reflecting  on  the  consortium’s  place  in  historical
perspective.
 
The Eritrea Inter Agency Consortium in the cross-
border operation
7 EIAC’s projects were set within a complex, long-running conflict.17 Eritrea and Ethiopia
were federated by United Nations (UN) mandate in 1950, provoking Eritrean resistance
that turned towards guerrilla warfare following the creation of the Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF) in 1960; two years later Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in violation of the UN
mandate.  The  EPLF  emerged  as  a  rival  from  within  the  ELF  in 1970,  and  conflict
intensified –between the Eritrean liberation fronts and between them and authorities
in Ethiopia– after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 by a military junta.
By the late 1970s, the war in Ethiopia pitted the Provisional Military Government of
Socialist Ethiopia (also known as the Derg), against multiple rebel fronts from different
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regions. By the mid-1980s the two most powerful of the armed groups, the Eritrean
People’s Liberation Front and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), were active
across large rural areas in northern Ethiopia, with the Derg holding towns. Around this
time, drought combined with the conflict conditions to produce severe famine across
large parts of the country. Following an initial refusal to allow external aid and then a
major transnational mobilisation, the Derg under Mengistu Haile Mariam used relief
projects to facilitate its collectivisation and counter-insurgency campaigns.18 While the
EPLF  and  TPLF  had  had  different  military  strategies,  both  adopted  a  strategy  of
“people’s war” in which social  support and reform strategies were integral to their
ideologies  and  independence  campaigns.19 The  cross-border  operation  as  a  whole
increased  the  resources  and  capacity  of  the  rebel  fronts  even  as  –indeed,  partly
because– it was focused on supporting civilians.20
8 Each of the movements opposing the Derg had a relief wing devoted to requesting,
receiving and delivering aid.21 The EPLF’s  was called the Eritrean Relief  Association
(ERA). Created in 1975, ERA was a transnational organisation that channelled support
from the highly active Eritrean diaspora and foreign networks to the EPLF’s relief and
social services. ERA had a head office in Khartoum and a “foreign office » in Cologne,
which  coordinated  its  international  supporters  and  affiliates.  It  had  branches  in
Australia, the Middle East, Europe, and North America. According to one of its publicity
brochures,  ERA had expertise  in  logistics,  relief,  research and information,  finance,
administration, and field projects.  It  was presented, in language echoing much NGO
marketing, as a “nonpolitical, nonreligious organization which solicits and distributes
material  aid  for  Eritreans”  and  “the  only  multi-purpose  agency  working  in 80%  of
Eritrea”.22 Nonetheless, it was (in David Pool’s words) a “para-EPLF organization” and
inseparable from the political and military struggle for independence.23
9 The relief  wings worked closely with different groups of  western NGOs and church
agencies in the cross-border aid effort that operated out of Sudan and, illegally, into
Ethiopian  territory.  Cold  War  politics  fuelled  the  cross-border  operation:  with
Mengistu’s Ethiopia backed by the Soviet Union, operations in northern conflict zones
presented a way of responding to famine without channelling resources to the Derg;
the  famine  response,  particularly  after  the  publicity  of 1984,  presented  a  way  of
undermining the Derg while playing a humanitarian card.24 The largest and best-known
cross-border  consortium was  the  Emergency  Relief  Desk  (ERD),  made  up  of  mostly
Protestant agencies. The ERD was responsible for more than half the total cross-border
operation, providing cash and in kind assistance worth approximately US $ 350 million.
25 The ERD served as a supposedly apolitical “buffer” for other agencies and especially
for donor governments that did not wish to openly violate Ethiopian sovereignty by
engaging directly with the rebel fronts –notably the United States, which from 1985-90
provided on average more than half of the relief assistance channeled through ERD.26
The ERD worked with the relief wings of both the EPLF and the TPLF, which it referred
to euphemistically as “implementing agencies”.
10 The Eritrea Inter Agency Consortium, which this article focuses on, was less concerned
with neutrality. It had its origins in the Ethiopian relief programmes of Euro Action
Acord (EAA, now known as ACORD), another collective of mostly European NGOs.27 EAA
funded programmes for the support of Eritreans as early as 1977, three years after the
end of Haile Selassie’s rule. Approached by the Eritrean Relief Association to expand
from relief  work and refugee assistance into development,  in June 1983 it  sent  two
Relief, Development and the Eritrean War of Independence: Subverting the Anti...
Histoire Politique, 41 | 2020
4
consultants to undertake an investigatory mission. Their report acknowledged that the
work “may be controversial” but argued that “a decision not to programme in Eritrea
will  possibly  have  as  many  repercussions  as  a  decision  to  go  ahead  and  provide
support28 With  EAA  deciding  not  to  go  ahead,  however,  some  of  its  member
organisations formed a new grouping to take up the call.
11 The “consortium supporting the Eritrea Agricultural  Programme” (EAP,  later  called
EIAC, also “the consortium”) had its first meeting in August 1983. A Steering Committee
was set up shortly afterwards.29 War on Want became the “acting agency” –that is, the
motor  of  the  consortium’s  activities,  supplying  the  secretary  and  intermittently
deploying  organisational  resources  such  as  grant-writers  and  accountants.  War  on
Want was able to take this on because it did not have any aid operations based in Addis
Ababa. Indeed, this was an ideal cause for them: the EPLF’s ideology of self-reliance
matched  War  on  Want’s  framework  of  left-wing  solidarity  and  made  it  possible  to
emphasise  urgency  in  the  war  and  famine  without  resorting  to  the  begging  bowl
imagery that War on Want disliked. The other member agencies at the first meeting
were the Comité belge de secours à l’Érythrée (Belgian Committee for Relief to Eritrea,
Belgium), Novib (Holland), and Oxfam (UK).
12 The consortium operated solely through the Eritrean Relief Association. Despite being
officially a “partner” rather than a member, ERA played a crucial role in shaping the
consortium’s strategies. An agreement on responsibilities, signed in January 1984, laid
out the roles of the consortium and the Eritrean Relief Association. The former was
responsible  for  raising  funds,  the  latter  for  implementation  and  reporting30.  ERA
representatives  regularly  attended  meetings,  providing  briefings  and  answering
questions  about  implementation  requirements  and  priorities.  At  the  outset,
consultation with ERA established that –of four proposed projects –the water supply
project (well digging) was the most urgent, followed by in order of priority: veterinary
care (animal health and vaccination); agricultural inputs (providing seeds and tools);
and  support  for  displaced  persons  in  ERA-run  camps  (a  poultry-raising  project  to
provide  personal  income).31 The  fundraising  strategy  was  also  strongly  influenced,
arguably even directed, by ERA leadership, which requested that the consortium seek
its  approval  before  establishing new contacts  with other  agencies  and NGOs.32 This
attitude reflected ERA’s strategy of maintaining multifaceted contacts with as many
groups  as  possible  (tellingly,  by 1983  they  had  links  of  different  kinds  with  over
120 agencies33).  Over time ERA negotiated to receive a proportion of the budget for
administrative costs, which initially went to War on Want and Oxfam.
13 There  appears  to  be  little  doubt  that  the  consortium  operated  effectively.  In
October 1983, the fundraising target was £281,541.34 Four years later it was ten times
that amount. A small proportion of the increase was caused by unexpected changes in
costs and difficulties in accessing supplies –hikes in seed prices or parts that couldn’t
be found locally.35 More importantly, the addition of new projects meant that targets
rose significantly as the consortium’s work consolidated. The number of “supporting
agencies” (that  is,  NGOs involved in the consortium) went from four to  fifteen.36 A
number  of  these  were  left-wing  organisations,  including  Norwegian  People’s  Aid,
Entr’Aide  ouvriere  internationale,  and  other  union-affiliated  groups;  most  were
European (including Britain)  although Oxfam Canada and US also participated.  ERA
wished to be consulted before any new organisations joined.37
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14 For  aid  organisations,  working  collectively  appeared  more  efficient  in  terms  of
accessing information, consolidating fundraising, and cutting down on paperwork.38 In
contrast, as a rule, ERA preferred bilateral relationships with NGOs to conducting its
business  via consortia.  The  reason  given  was  that  the  relationships  with  consortia
tended to become (in their words) “impersonal” and led to agencies making decisions
without  consultation.39 Others  have pointed out  that  the strategic  position of  some
consortia as “buffers” between donors and the Eritrean independence fighters made
them unlikely to do any public advocacy, which was a source of frustration for the
EPLF.40 This is one of the aspects in which the Emergency Relief Desk differed from the
EIAC, which adopted a more partisan position.
 
Aid in a Liberation War
15 Support for the independence cause coloured the consortium’s approach to the relief
and development work they facilitated. However, the difficult line between political
engagement and technocratic dissemblance that the consortium had to walk during its
cooperation with the Eritrean Relief Agency was, on the whole, more of a challenge for
its external image than its internal functioning.
16 While  much  has  been  made  of  the  cross-border  operation’s  violation  of  Ethiopian
sovereignty  in  contrast  with  the  UN’s  more  conservative  position,  for  Eritrean
supporters the violation had already taken place with the denial of Eritrean statehood.
The argument for Eritrean independence drew upon a combination of historical claims,
social and political agendas, and victim narratives. According to this argument, Italian
colonisation  of  Eritrea  dating  back  to 1889  cemented  an  experience,  identity  and
trajectory  distinct  from  that  of  Ethiopia  (which  was  never  colonised).41 The  EPLF
assertion of Eritrea’s “just and legitimate national question” cited its socio-economic
system, historically  specific  experiences,  foreign oppression,  political  consciousness,
and the sacrifice of Eritrean “martyrs”.42 Late in the war sociologist John Sorenson, who
studied societies in the Horn of Africa and who participated in the relief effort, summed
up that “Eritrean identity has been strengthened to the precise extent that it has been
forcibly  denied  and  repressed”.43 With  the  return  of  famine  in  the 1980s  came  an
opportunity to emphasise the innocence of the civilian victims as well as the urgency of
the goal of self-reliance.
17 Politically  and  logistically,  the  civil  war  shaped  much  of  how  the  consortium  was
designed  and  operated.  Consortium  documents  referred  to  potential  sites  of
intervention as “liberated” and “semi-liberated”, adopting the language of the rebel
fronts. Consortium members often expressed admiration for the skills and commitment
of  the  EPLF  and  its  functionaries,  who  were  described  as  highly  educated,  highly
proficient,  and  socially  diverse.  For  example,  in  the  context  of  its  expansion  the
consortium steering group noted that external agencies need not seek an operational
role as “local organisations are strong and technically self-reliant”.44
18 The intertwined tropes and multiple channels that connected the relief effort to the
independence campaign are epitomised in the 1984 book,  Never Kneel  Down:  Drought,
Development and Liberation in Eritrea. The book was based on a visit to Eritrea of Stuart
Holland, Labour Spokesman for Overseas Aid and Development; Jenny Holland of the
New Socialist; and James Firebrace. Firebrace was Programme Officer for the Sahel and
Horn of Africa at War on Want and the Secretary of the EIAC. On 10 February 1984, he
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asked  ERA  head  Paulos  Tesfagiorgis  to  communicate  on  their  behalf  with  EPLF
representatives  and to  make arrangements  for  the Labour parliamentarian to  meet
with members of the EPLF Politburo, while also requesting that Paulos accompany the
visitors  to  ensure  that  his  relief  credentials  shaped  perceptions  of  the  trip.45 The
subsequent account of this visit, Never Kneel Down, linked Eritrean independence with
humanitarian goals, declaring that “Peace is a precondition for an Eritrea free from
famine”.46 Never Kneel Down was followed in 1985 by Eritrean Journey, a reportage by four
European women of  women’s  experiences  of  the  liberation  struggle  and associated
social programs.47 The book was recognized for challenging portrayals of East African
politics and societies based on passivity and victimhood.48
19 In addition to this advocacy, the consortium and its member agencies became involved
in different supporter campaigns. When in 1988 an opportunity arose to join a newly
established European Working Group for Peace in the Horn of Africa, the consortium
steering committee noted: “It was generally felt that EIAC as such could not join this
working group because [it] was a ‘partial’ organisation whose sole partner was ERA.
Furthermore,  the  mixture  of  development  and  ‘political’  work  could  alienate  some
funding sources. However, EIAC could recommend that all member agencies join the
Working  Group  and  could  also  document  the  impact  of  war  […]  and  exchange
information”.49 So, somewhat paradoxically, a collective agency that enabled donors to
support projects run by a secessionist opposition movement also seemingly allowed its
member agencies to push for peace free from this partisan reputation. This reversed
the  ERD’s  model  of  collective  neutrality,  although  both  left  space  for  individual
agencies to take public positions.50
20 The aid effort also contributed to the EPLF’s struggle for independence by providing an
opportunity  for  what  Zachariah  Mampilly  has  termed “insurgent  governance”.51 As
Mampilly has argued, “the use of symbolic processes to bolster sovereign claims” is an
area  in  which  armed  groups  invest  significantly,  showing  the  importance  of  the
symbolic domain as part of a multifaceted struggle that goes beyond military conflict.52
The performative aspects of the relief campaign offered the EPLF, through its relief
arm, a chance to demonstrate its capacity for independent rule. ERA produced needs
assessments that described the situation in Eritrea, identified relief and development
gaps, and quantified the requirements that followed from this analysis. It was required
to submit bi-annual reports to the consortium and to provide receipts and justifications
of  spending;  subsequent  release  of  funds  was  supposed  to  be  conditional  to  these
accountability  measures.53 There  were  many  problems  with  the  irregularity  and
coverage of the reports, and they were supplemented with field visits by consortium
and NGO staff members, although it was impossible to undertake independent visits to
Eritrea for any purpose.54 As has been more explicitly shown in the case of REST and the
TPLF,  this  created  the  potential  for  the  direct  appropriation  of  aid,  and  certainly
created the conditions for fungible resources to be reallocated towards the military
effort,  thanks  to  the  receipt  of  aid,  without  real  oversight  from external  donors.55
Nonetheless,  ERA’s  materials  were  valued  for  their  professionalism.  While  the
reporting  burden  reflected  concerns  about  potential  diversion  of  aid,  it  ultimately
contributed to ERA’s standing as a credible and effective aid partner.56
21 EPLF  press  releases  also  show  the  importance  of  aid  in  its  public  positioning.
Diplomatically speaking, the famine offered Ethiopia an opportunity to present itself as
a  victim  of  natural  forces  and  to  reinforce  its  discourse  about  Eritrean  claims  as
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secessionist and illegitimate.57 In 1987, the EPLF proposed an agreement between itself,
the  Derg,  their  respective  relief  wings,  and  other  aid  organisations,  to  allow  safe
passage  for  relief  activities,  illustrating  its  use  of  spaces  of  aid  for  diplomatic
recognition.58 It condemned the Derg’s failure to take responsibility for “the disaster
that was to a large extent of its own making” and, in 1988, criticised aid agencies for
“working  to  promote  the  schemes  of  the  regime”  which  bent  aid  to  its
counterinsurgency and population transfer goals59.  The EPLF also tied aid to its own
military victories. For instance, after capturing the port of Massawa in February 1990, it
called for increased aid through the port as well as the cross-border route.60 Later that
year, EPLF leader Isaias Afwerki issued a joint communique with US Senator Humphrey
Gordon, calling for more relief supplies.61
22 By the late 1980s, there were three consortia being led by War on Want: one for Eritrea,
one for Tigray, and one for refugees from Western Sahara. In this context, the seeming
success of the Eritrea Inter Agency Consortium came alongside marked instability. In
October 1988  –which  was  more  than  two  years  after  an  ERA  request  that  the
consortium specialise  in  water  programmes–  the  steering  committee  discussed two
new requests from ERA. Neither of the new proposals involved water and each of them
alone was bigger than any of the consortium’s previous projects.62 The first required
£2 million  for  locust  control,  including  emergency  measures  and  a  long-term
component.63 The  second  project  was  to  improve  transport  through  purchase  and
maintenance of trucks, plus supply of road construction materials64. Though forms of
these projects went ahead, the consortium’s investigations following the initial request
arrived at a budget of £7 million or more –a leap in scale and logistical challenge that
provoked significant concern amongst Steering Committee members.65
23 Throughout  the  consortium’s  lifespan,  War  on  Want  had  been  a  controversial
organisation,  headed  by  a  polarising  figure,  and  riven  by  internal  conflicts.  In  the
financial  year 1988-89,  War  on  Want’s  annual  income was  just  over  £8.7 million,  of
which £3.4 million was income for the three consortia. However, it spent £4.7 million
on the consortia, while also overspending on its total accounts.66 Late in their existence,
before being transferred to the full control of the rebel fronts, the Eritrea and Tigray
consortia were moved out of War on Want and, in the case of EIAC at least, moved into
Novib, transiting through Christian Aid.67 According to one participant, this was in part
because  they  were  perceived  as  being  too  politically  close  to  the  rebel  fronts  and
needed to be administered more neutrally.68 Conversely, War on Want’s “authorised
history” suggests that moves to establish projects with the Ethiopian Derg so offended
the consortia that their committees decided to end War on Want’s lead role.69 It was
also a function of War on Want’s instability at the time: by the start of the 1990s it was
on the verge of insolvency, closing off programmes in an attempt to stay afloat. By
mid-1990 War on Want had asked that it no longer be considered a member of EIAC.70
24 Around this time, however, the balance of the war in Ethiopia was changing. By 1989,
the EPLF was gaining ground, besieging and winning key government-held towns in
Eritrea including the port of Massawa and the capital, Asmara. With rainfall in 1989-90
severely insufficient, ERA requests for relief show mounting needs caused by drought
famine, ongoing displacement, and increasing numbers of civilians in EPLF-controlled
territories.71 Ethiopian air raids on Massawa after it was captured by the EPLF had a
dire effect on food aid in the area and reinvigorated calls to work through the rebel
authorities,72 but may not have directly affected consortium programmes which were
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largely not based in the towns.  Asmara fell  to the EPLF in May 1991.  With the war
ending in the defeat of the Derg later that year, aid programmes either wound down or
changed in nature, transferring over to EPLF control.
25 Short-lived initiatives like the Eritrea Inter Agency Consortium can be hard to place
against  the  longer  time  frame  of  many  organisational  histories.  Nonetheless,  this
article reminds us that these initiatives are not opposed to longer narratives but form
part of them and can shed light on key moments in their passage. As Ann Laura Stoler
has underlined, “ ‘minor’ histories should not be mistaken for trivial ones” and do not
function as major histories in miniature.73 In fact, from many perspectives the long-
lasting organisations that tend to attract researchers –historians and others– are the
exception rather than the rule within a shifting ecosystem of local and transnational
engagements.
26 In  this  case,  the  challenges  of  working  as  a  consortium  of  aid  agencies  at  times
appeared greater  than the political  complications that  arose from working with an
armed group. Tension seems to have been just as likely amongst different aid agencies,
or between agencies and donors, as between them and their interlocutors in the rebel
front. Perhaps predictably, most of these tensions were around money, with periodic
concerns about the consortium seeking funding from some of the same donors as its
own  member  agencies.74 Nonetheless,  collaborative  work  enhanced  the  capacity  of
smaller organisations and enabled the cross-border operation’s challenge to Ethiopian
sovereignty.  The  consortium  for  Eritrea  carved  out  an  effective  space  for  itself,
increasing the ambition and scale of its operations in the face of difficult logistics and
delicate politics. Its expansion, within that of the cross-border operation more widely,
was shaped by the Cold War agendas of  the major  donors.  While  others’  Cold War
concerns brought resources, however, these concerns were not the driver of the cross-
border consortium. Its  embrace of  the politics  of  solidarity  reflected the agenda of
certain  member  agencies  as  well  as  optimism  about  the  future  of  an  independent
Eritrea.
27 When aid takes hybrid forms, and embraces partisanship rather than neutrality, it can
sit uncomfortably within debates about the politics of aid and the role of humanitarian
principles.  The  case  of  Eritrea,  outside  the  major  decolonisation  phases  yet  in  the
tradition  of  the  national  liberation  agenda,  presented  a  subversive  use  of
development’s “anti-politics machine” in favour of an independence struggle. The story
of the EIAC thus helps us better understand the stakes of political solidarity in an era
when the  Western “saviour  syndrome »  structured most  images  of  suffering in  the
global South. Eritrean ideologies,  expertise, and implementation were crucial to the
functioning of the consortium. These negotiated, hybrid practices and their complex
institutional arrangements challenge any neat narratives about purity and progress in
the work of development and relief.
Relief, Development and the Eritrean War of Independence: Subverting the Anti...
Histoire Politique, 41 | 2020
9
NOTES
1. John Borton, The Changing Role of NGOs in the Provision of Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance: Case
Study 3  -  Northern  Ethiopia  and  Eritrea,  ODI  Working  Paper,  London,  Overseas  Development
Institute,  1993, p. 5;  Michael  Barnett,  Empire  of  Humanity:  A  History of  Humanitarianism,  Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 2011, p. 156. I am indebted to Roger Briottet for sharing his personal
archive,  without  which  this  study  would  have  been  impossible.  I  am  grateful  also  to  Skage
Alexander Østberg for invaluable research assistance, to archivists at the collections cited, and to
the  British  Academy  for  vital  funding  through  its  Postdoctoral  Fellowship  scheme.  I  have
presented aspects of this research at Keele University’s Modern History Seminar ; the Modern
European  History  Seminar  at  the  University  of  Cambridge’ ;  the  Humanitarian  and  Conflict
Response Institute at the University of Manchester ; and the International Humanitarian Studies
Association conference and am grateful for all  those discussions and the feedback I received.
Finally,  I  would like to thank the editors of  this  issue and the anonymous reviewers for the
invitation, comments, and support.
2. Alex  De  Waal,  Famine  Crimes:  Politics  and  the  Disaster  Relief  Industry  in  Africa,  Oxford,
Bloomington, Currey, Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 131.
3. The discussion below focuses on Anglophone scholarship. For an introduction to Francophone
scholarly  and  aid  debates  proximate  to  the  period  under  discussion  see,  for  example,  Jean-
Christophe Rufin, Le piège, quand l’aide humanitaire remplace la guerre, Paris, Hachette, 1993; Pascal
Dauvin and Johanna Siméant, Le travail humanitaire: les acteurs des ONG, du siège au terrain, Paris,
Presses de Sciences Po, 2002; Philippe Mesnard, La victime écran: la répresentation humanitaire en
question, Paris, Textuel, 2002; Laëtitia Atlani-Duault, Au bonheur des autres: anthropologie de l’aide
humanitaire, Nanterre, Société d’éthnologie, 2005; Philippe Ryfman, Une histoire de l’humanitaire,
Paris, La Découverte, 2008 ; See also Eleanor Davey, Beyond the “French Doctors”: The Evolution and
Interpretation of Humanitarian Action in France, London, Overseas Development Institute, 2012. 
4. Joseph  Morgan  Hodge,  “Writing  the  History  of  Development  (Part 1:  The  First  Wave)”,
Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, vol. 6, n° 3,
2015, p. 443, 449. 
5. See Joanna Macrae, “The Death of Humanitarianism?: An Anatomy of the Attack”, Disasters,
vol. 22, no 4, 1998, p. 309-317; Fiona Fox, “New Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral Banner
for the 21st Century?”, Disasters, vol. 25, no 4, 2001, p. 275-289
6. David  Mosse  (ed.),  Adventures  in  Aidland:  The  Anthropology  of  Professionals  in  International
Development, New York, Berghahn Books, 2011.
7. See for example Abby Stoddard et al., The State of the Humanitarian System, London, ALNAP, 2015,
p. 72-73;  Jennifer  Rubenstein,  Between Samaritans  and States:  The  Political  Ethics  of  Humanitarian
INGOs, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016.
8. Keith Krause and Jennifer Milliken, “Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed Groups”,
Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 30, n° 2, 2009, p. 202-220.
9. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict”,
International  Security,  vol. 28,  n° 1,  2003,  p. 79-109;  Antonio  Donini  (ed.),  The  Golden  Fleece:
Manipulation and Independence in Humanitarian Action, Bloomfield, Kumarian, 2012.
10. Zachariah Mampilly,  Rebel  Rulers:  Insurgent  Governance  and  Civilian  Life  during  War,  Ithaca,
Cornell  University  Press,  2011;  Klaus Schlichte,  In  the  Shadow of  Violence:  The  Politics  of  Armed
Groups, Frankfurt; New York, Campus Verlag, 2009; Keith Krause, Armed Groups and Contemporary
Conflicts: Challenging the Weberian State, London, Routledge, 2010.
Relief, Development and the Eritrean War of Independence: Subverting the Anti...
Histoire Politique, 41 | 2020
10
11. Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the
Post-Cold War Era, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002 ; Jennifer Johnson, The Battle for Algeria:
Sovereignty, Health Care, and Humanitarianism, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.
12. Born  in  France,  Briottet  travelled  to  Algeria  as  a  volunteer  following  the  Orléansville
earthquake of 1954 and was later redeployed as a French military conscript during Algeria’s War
of Independence. He served with International Voluntary Service (IVS) and was President of the
Coordinating Committee of the IVS 1962-64. After moving to the UK he taught at South Bank
University –this period overlapping with his time as chairman of EIAC and the Tigray Transport
and Agriculture Consortium (TTAC). He worked for the United Nations in Haiti and East Timor
and was also director of the World Development Movement and of Mines Advisory Group. In
Ethiopia after the fall of the Derg he was advisor to the Special Prosecutor for alleged crimes
against humanity, subsequently serving as chargé de mission for the European Union in Ethiopia
and observer at the trial of opposition leaders from 2006. Roger passed away in 2019.
13. Unless otherwise indicated, documents relating to the EIAC were accessed courtesy of Roger
Briottet from his personal collection. These materials are not currently catalogued or organised
and so no accession numbers are used. The War on Want and Christian Aid archives are both held
in  the  School  of  Oriental  and  African  Studies  (SOAS)  Archive  Collection,  London;  that  of
Norwegian Church Aid [Kirkens Nødhjelp] is held in the Norwegian National Archives [NNA].
14. Hannah Miller, “A Change in Charity Law for England and Wales: Examining War on Want’s
Foremost Adoption of the New Human Rights Charitable Purpose”, The International  Journal  of
Human Rights, vol. 16, n° 7, 2012, p. 1003-1022.
15. James Ferguson, The Anti-politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power
in Lesotho, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
16. Ibid., p. 256.
17. See  Ruth  Iyob,  The  Eritrean  Struggle  for  Independence:  Domination,  Resistance,  Nationalism,
1941-1993, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
18. Peter Cutler,  The Development  of  the  1983-85  Famine in  Northern Ethiopia,  PhD, University of
London,  1988;  Alex  de  Waal,  Famine  Crimes, op. cit. ,  p. 106-132;  Eleanor  Davey,  Idealism Beyond
Borders:  The  French  Revolutionary  Left  and  the  Rise  of  Humanitarianism,  1954-1988,  Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 215-247.
19. Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson, The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive
Peace, Nottingham, Spokesman, 1988; John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: TPLF, 1975-1991,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 172-196.
20. Ondine Barrow, “International Responses to Famine in Ethiopia 1983-85: Christian Aid and a
Political Economy Framework for Action”, in Ondine Barrow and Michael Jennings (eds.),  The
Charitable Impulse: NGOs & Development in East and North-East Africa, Oxford, James Currey, 2001,
p. 77; Mark Duffield and John Prendergast, “Sovereignty and Intervention after the Cold War:
Lessons  from the  Emergency  Relief  Desk”,  Middle  East  Report,  n° 187/188,  1994,  p. 9-15;  Mark
Duffield and John Prendergast,  Without  Troops  & Tanks:  The Emergency Relief  Desk and the Cross
Border Operation into Eritrea and Tigray, Lawrenceville, NJ, Red Sea Press, 1994, p. 14, p. 29; Barbara
Hendrie,  “Cross-Border  Relief  Operations  in  Eritrea  and Tigray”,  Disasters,  vol. 13,  n° 4,  1989,
p. 357-358; Terje Tvedt, Angels of  Mercy or Development Diplomats? NGOs and Foreign Aid,  Oxford,
Trenton, James Currey, Africa World Press, 1998, p. 115.
21. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front operated through the Eritrean Relief Association; the
Eritrean Liberation Front, which had also participated in ERA, formed the Eritrean Red Cross-
Crescent Society (ERCCS); the Tigray People’s Liberation Front ran the Relief Society of Tigray
(REST); and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) had the Oromo Relief Association (ORA).
22. Hoover  Institution  Archives,  Box 3.  Eritrean  Relief  Association,  brochure,  undated,  p. 2.
Eritrean subject collection, 1941-2014. For a similar description of REST which also acknowledges
Relief, Development and the Eritrean War of Independence: Subverting the Anti...
Histoire Politique, 41 | 2020
11
the importance of  the TPLF’s  political  programme,  see Kirsty Wright,  “Combating Famine:  A
Revolutionary Strategy”, Review of African Political Economy, n° 30, 1984, p. 102.
23. David Pool, From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean People's Liberation Front, Oxford, James
Currey, 2001, p. 142-43.
24. See Alexander Poster, “The Gentle War: Famine Relief, Politics, and Privatization in Ethiopia,
1983-1986”,  Diplomatic  History, vol. 36,  n° 2,  2012,  esp. 415-423;  Martin  Plaut,  “The  Ethiopian
Famine:  War,  Weapons  and  Aid”,  The  RUSI  Journal,  vol. 162, n° 6,  2017,  p. 40-41.  Poster  also
highlights US funding channelled to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
25. Duffield and Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks, op. cit., p. 6.
26. Ibid.,  p. 67.  Other donors included the European Community,  European governments,  and
Canada.
27. Alan Fowler, 1976-2010, ACORD’s Transformation: Overcoming Uncertainty, London, ACORD, 2012,
p. 13-14.
28. Ian Robinson and Chris Wardle, Mission to Assess and Identify Agricultural Programme Possibilities
in Eritrea, Report for Euro Action Acord, June 1983, p. 44-45.
29. James Firebrace, Letter to Roger Briottet, London, 20 October 1983.
30. Agreement  between  the  Eritrean  Relief  Association  and  the  Steering  Committee  of  the
Consortium  supporting  the  Eritrea  Agricultural  Programme,  undated.  The  signatories  were:
Paulos Tesfagiorgis, Chairman of ERA; Roger Briottet, Chairman of the Steering Committee; James
Firebrace, Secretary of the Steering Committee; George Galloway, on behalf of War on Want, the
acting agency. The consortium’s role was similar to that of ERD although the mechanics of the
agreement differed. See Tvedt, Angels of Mercy, op. cit.,p. 153; Duffield and Prendergast, Without
Troops & Tanks, op. cit., p. 47-49, 80-82.
31. Minutes of Meeting of Steering Committee of Agencies Supporting the Eritrea Agricultural
Programme, held at War on Want, 11 November 1983; Minutes of the Meeting of the Steering
Committee  of  Agencies  Supporting  the  Eretrean [sic]  Agricultural  Programme Held  at  NCOS,
29 June 1984. 
32. Minutes of Meeting of Steering Committee of Agencies Supporting the Eritrea Agricultural
Programme, held at War on Want, 11 November 1983, p. 2.
33. Duffield and Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks, op. cit., p. 80.
34. Summary  Minutes  of  meeting  between  War  on  Want  and  ERA  at  War  on  Want  offices,
7 October 1983, p. 1.
35. On seed prices, see Summary Minutes of Meeting about “Send a Tonne to Africa Appeal” and
Eritrea Agricultural Programme, War on Want, 2 July 1984, p. 3. 
36. These were War on Want, Oxfam, Christian Aid; Send a Tonne to Africa Development Fund
(UK); Comité Belge de Secours à l’Érythrée, the National Centre for Development Cooperation
(Belgium);  Entr’aide  Ouvriere  Internationale,  Group  d’Aide  aux  Realisations  pour  le
Developpement (France); Arbeiterwohlfahrt (Germany); Mani Tese (Italy); Novib (Netherlands);
Radda Barnen (Sweden);  Norwegian People’s  Aid;  Danish People’s  Aid;  Oxfam US;  and Oxfam
Canada.
37. Roger Briottet, Memorandum to James Firebrace, 21 April 1985. 
38. Minutes of the Eritrea Inter-Agency Consortium Steering Committee Meeting, held at War on
Want, 19 June 1986, p. 5.
39. Ibid.
40. Duffield and Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks, op. cit., p. 7; Tvedt, Angels of Mercy, op. cit.,
p. 154; Barrow, “International Responses to Famine in Ethiopia”, op. cit., p. 71.
41. Zdenek Červenka, “Eritrea: Struggle for Self-Determination or Secession?”, Africa Spectrum,
vol. 12, n° 1, 1977, p. 37-38; David Pool, Eritrea – Africa’s Longest War, London, Anti-Slavery Society,
1979, p. 17-20;  Richard  Sherman,  Eritrea:  The  Unfinished  Revolution,  New  York,  Praeger,  1980,
p. 32-36.
Relief, Development and the Eritrean War of Independence: Subverting the Anti...
Histoire Politique, 41 | 2020
12
42. The Right of the Eritrean People to Self-Determination, April 1978, published in Pool, Eritrea, 
op. cit., p. 61-62.
43. John Sorenson, “Opposition, Exile and Identity: The Eritrean Case” »Journal of Refugee Studies, 
3:4 (1990), p. 302.
44. Minutes  of  meeting  of  the  steering  committee  of  agencies  supporting  Ertrean  [sic]
Agricultural Programme, at War on Want, 13 April 1984, p. 1. 
45. James Firebrace, Letter to Paulos Tesfagiorgis, London, 10 February 1984, p. 1. 
46. James Firebrace and Stuart Holland, Never Kneel Down: Drought, Development and Liberation in
Eritrea, Nottingham, Spokesman, 1984, p. 89.
47. Doris Burgess, Jenny Pierce, Jenny Rossiter, and Trish Silkin, Eritrean Journey, London, War on
Want, 1985.
48. Tina Wallace, review article, Review of African Political Economy, 35 (1986), p. 96-97.
49. Minutes of the Eritrea Inter-Agency Consortium Steering Committee, CBSE, October 26 1988,
p. 4.
50. Duffield  and  Prendergast,  Without  Troops  &  Tanks,  op. cit.,  p. 50;  Barrow,  “International
Responses to Famine in Ethiopia”, op. cit., p. 74.
51. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, op. cit.
52. Zachariah  Mampilly,  “Performing  the  Nation-State:  Rebel  Governance  and  Symbolic
Processes”, in Zachariah Mampilly, Nelson Kasfir and Ana Arjona (eds.), Rebel Governance in Civil
War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 77.
53. Agreement  between  the  Eritrean  Relief  Association  and  the  Steering  Committee  of  the
Consortium supporting the Eritrea Agricultural Programme, p. 1.
54. Trish  Silkin  and  Barbara  Hendrie,  “Research  in  the  War  Zones  of  Eritrea  and  Northern
Ethiopia”, Disasters, 21:2 (1997), p. 166-76. 
55. See Plaut, “The Ethiopian Famine”, op. cit.
56. Duffield and Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks, op. cit., p. 28. 
57. Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence, op. cit., p. 44.
58. Hoover  Institution  Archives,  Box 3.  EPLF,  “Statement  on  international  relief  efforts in
Eritrea”, press release, 27 October 1987. Eritrean subject collection, 1941-2014.
59. Hoover  Institution  Archives,  Box 3.  EPLF,  “Second  statement  on  emergency  relief
operations”, press release, 28 November 1987; EPLF, “An urgent call to all relief agencies”, press
release, 6 April 1988. Eritrean subject collection, 1941-2014.
60. Hoover  Institution Archives,  Box 3.  EPLF,  “Urgent  appeal  to  concerned governments  and
donor agencies”, press release, 19 April 1990. Eritrean subject collection, 1941-2014.
61. Joint communique from Senator Gordon J. Humphrey (R-NH) and Secretary General Isaias
Afwerki  of  the  Eritrean  People’s  Liberation  Front,  16 June 1990.  Hoover  Institution,  Eritrean
subject collection, 1941-2014, Box 3.
62. The final budget was £1,933,249 over more than three years.  Minutes of the Eritrea Inter
Agency Consortium Steering Committee meeting, held at War on Want, 4 June 1987, p. 4. 
63. Minutes of the Steering Committee Meeting, held at CBSE, 26 October 1988, p. 2-3.
64. Ibid.
65. Summary minutes of the EIAC extraordinary steering committee meeting, undated. 
66. Mark Luetchford and Peter Burns, Waging the War on Want: 50 years of Campaigning against World
Poverty: An Authorised History, London, War on Want, 2003, p. 162. 
67. SOAS Archive Collection,  War on Want collection,  Accession Number 00436,  Box 93.  EIAC
Executive Committee Meeting of 26/03/90; NNA Kirkens Nødhjelp collection, RA/PA-1641/E/Ea/
L0115f/0002.  Eritrea,  folder 2.  Summary  of  Decisions  Taken,  2 April 1990,  p. 2.  See  also  EIAC
Administration and Relocation Budgets, 30 January 1990, with figures in gilders. By this time the
Chair was Paul Meijs and the Coordinator Martine Billanou.
68. Interview with a contributor to the cross-border operation, 20 April 2017. 
Relief, Development and the Eritrean War of Independence: Subverting the Anti...
Histoire Politique, 41 | 2020
13
69. Luetchford and Burns, Waging the War on Want, op. cit., p. 163. 
70. NNA  Kirkens  Nødhjelp  collection,  RA/PA-1641/E/Ea/L0115f/0002.  Eritrea,  folder 2.  EIAC
Membership and Administration Income, Paper no. 5 for General Assembly meeting 19 June 1990,
p. 1.
71. See for example Emergency Relief Budget; A Preliminary Request for 1990, ERA, October 1989;
A Preliminary Assessment  of  Relief  Needs  in  Eritrea,  ERA,  30 August 1990.  Both held in  NNA
Kirkens Nødhjelp collection, RA/PA-1641/E/Ea/L0115f/0002. Eritrea, folder 1. 
72. Borton, The Changing Role of  NGOs,  op. cit., p. 33-34; Victoria Brittain, “Food aid ‘should go
through rebel area’ ”, The Guardian, 6 April 1990, p. 12. 
73. Ann  Laura  Stoler,  Along  the  Archival  Grain:  Epistemic  Anxieties  and  Colonial  Common  Sense,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 7.
74. For example, James Firebrace, Letter to Richard Leonard, London, 18 November 1983; James
Firebrace,  Letter  to  Michele  Falisse  and Luis  de Cavalho,  London,  19 November 1983.  Finance
structures also made it difficult for the EIAC to receive funding from Band Aid. Minutes of the
Eritrea  Inter-Agency  Consortium  Steering  Committee  meeting,  held  at  War  on  Want,
14 June 1985, p. 6. 
ABSTRACTS
This  article  tells  the  story  of  a short-lived  collective  of  aid  agencies  that  operated  during
the 1980s and early 1990s, the Eritrea Inter Agency Consortium (EIAC). This fluctuating group of
mostly European organizations facilitated relief and development aid for Ethiopian citizens who
lived in or had fled from the secessionist region of Eritrea, during the civil war that resulted in
Eritrea’s independence. The consortium’s only partner for this aid was the Eritrean liberation
movement – nominally its « independent » aid wing, the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA), but
frequently the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) itself. The article discusses the work of
the  Eritrea  Inter  Agency  Consortium –  its  inception, its  relationship  with  its  Eritrean
interlocutors,  and the challenges it  faced as its programmes expanded. It  highlights how the
politics of national liberation were debated in the Eritrean case and the campaigning done in
Eritrea’s name.
Cet article retrace l’histoire d’un collectif d’agences humanitaires ayant brièvement opéré entre
les années 1980 et le début des années 1990 : le Eritrea Inter Agency Consortium (EIAC). Au cours
de la guerre civile qui aboutit à l’indépendance de l’Érythrée, ce groupe, composé essentiellement
d’organisations  européennes,  facilita  l’envoi  de  secours  et  la  mise  en  place  d’une  aide  au
développement à destination de cette région. Ces opérations furent montées en partenariat avec
le mouvement de libération de l’Érythrée, et plus particulièrement avec sa branche humanitaire
– l’Eritrean  Relief  Association  (ERA) –,  mais  aussi  avec  le  Front  populaire  de  libération  de
l’Érythrée  (FPLE)  lui-même.  Cet  article  examine  le  travail  mené  par  le  Eritrea  Inter  Agency
Consortium – ses débuts, ses relations avec les interlocuteurs érythréens et les défis auxquels il
fut  confronté  lors  du  développement  de  ses  programmes.  Il  met  notamment  en  lumière  la
manière dont la politique de libération nationale fut débattue et les modalités de la campagne
menée au nom de l’Érythrée.
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